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In the Court of Queen's Bench.
MAINPRICE v. WESTLEY. 1
The mortgagee of certain premises instructed an auctioneer to offer them on a
specified day by public auction for peremptory sale. A handbill -was thereupon
issued by the auctioneer, announcing the sale "by direction of the mortgagee,"
and also stating that further particulars might be obtained "from 'Mr. Hustwick,
solicitor, or the auctioneer." At the sale the plaintiff made the highest bid, with
the exception of Hustwick, who, acting for the vendor, outbid the plaintiff and
bought in the property.
In an action brought against the auctioneer for refusing to sell the premisems
peremptorily as advertised:
Held, that, under the circumstances above mentioned, he was not liable.

Tius was an action tried before BRAMWELL, B., at the Cambridgeshire Summer Assizes, 1864. The declaration stated that
the defendant, being an auctioneer, was retained to sell by public
auction a certain messuage, shop, and appurtenances, situated a,
Soham; and the defendant thereupon circulated certain handbills
and other notices wherein it was stated and represented by him
that he would offer the said messuage, &c., for peremptory sale
on the 1st of April 1864. And the plaintiff accordingly attended
the sale, and the said messuage, &c., was offered for sale in
pursuance of the said handbills, &c. ; and the plaintiff there and
then bid the highest price for the said messuage, &c., except
a certain price which was then and there, to the knowledge of the
defendant, wrongfully and contrary to the terms whereon the said
messuage, &c., were offered for sale, bid and offered by a certain
agent on behalf of the vendor. Then followed the averment of
performance of conditions precedent.
Breach-That the defendant, well knowing the premises, did
not nor would sell the said messuage, &c., peremptorily, or accept
the said offer and bid of the plaintiff, or declare the plaintiff to be
the highest'bidder and purchaser, whereby, &c.
The defendant pleaded not guilty, and traversed the various
allegations of the declaration as to the circulation of the handbills,
&c., and the breach. He also pleaded that "the said price bid
and offered at the said sale by the said agent was not a price bid
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and offered contrary to the terms on which it was stated by the
defendant as alleged, that the said messuage, &c., would be offered
for sale."
Upon the trial it appeared that in IMarch 1864, the defendant
caused certain handbills to be posted in Soham and its neighborhood, announcing a dwelling-house, grocer's shop, and beer-house
at Soham, Cambridgeshire, for peremptory sale by auction, by
direction of the mortgagee, on the 1st of April 1865, at the Crown
Inn, Soham. At the foot of the handbills were printed the following words:- - " For further particulars apply to Mr. Hustwick,
solicitor, or the auctioneer."
On the evening of the sale the plaintiff attended the auction.
At his request the conditions of sale were read by the agent of
the vendor, and in them it was stated that the " highest bidder
should be the purchaser." No right of bidding was reserved to
the vendor. The biddings slowly increased from £130 to X187,
which was offered by the plaintiff, and no higher sum being mentioned, the defendant, who acted as auctioneer, inquired of the
agent of the vendor (Mr. Hustwick) whether there was any
reserve. He was told there was, and that the sum was X195.
There being no advance on this price, the property was accordingly knocked down to the vendor as unsold. The plaintiff almost
immediately afterwards claimed the property of the defendant,
but it was not delivered to him. He thereupon brought this
action.
A verdict was entered for the plaintiff, subject to leave reserved
to enter it for the defendant. A rule nisi was obtained accordingly in Michaelmas Term 1864, by O'Malley, Q. C., calling on
the plaintiff to show cause why the verdict should not be entered
for the defendant, on the grounds that the plaintiff made out no
cause of action; that the allegations of the declaration were not
proved; that the breach was not proved; that on the facts proved
the verdict should have been for the defendant; that there was ne
contract in writing to bind the defendant; or why judgment should
not be arrested, on the ground that the declaration disclosed no
cause of action.
Lush, Q. C., Douglas Brown, and 1Warkcby showed cause, ane
contended that at a peremptory sale the highest bidder was of
necessity the purchaser.
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O'Mallefy, Q. C., and Keane, Q. C., in support of the rule,
contended that although the sale was advertised as peremptory,
yet the vendor had a right at the auction to place a reserve price
on his property.
The following cases were cited :-Franklynv. Lomond, 4 C.
B. 637; Dingwall v. Edwards, 12 W. R. 597; Warlow v.
H~arrison, 7 Id. 133, 1 E. & E. 295; in error, 29 L. J. Q. B.
14; Manser v. Back, 6 Hare 443; Hanson v. Boberdeau,
Peake N. P. Rep. 163.
The judgment of the court 1 was delivered by
BLACKBURN, J.-The declaration in this case contains averments that the defendant, being an auctioneer, retained to sell by
public auction a house and shop, published and circulated handbills, in which it was stated and represented by the defendant that
he, the defendant, would offer the said messuage and shop for
peremptory sale by public auction on a day and at a place named;
that the plaintiff, confiding in these statements and representations, attended at the time and plice ; and that the messuage -was
offered according to representations and statements, and the plaintiff then bid a price, which was the highest bid, except a sum
which, to the knowledge of the defendant, was bidden by an agent
on behalf of the vendor, contrary to the representation that the
sale was peremptory; yet the defendant did not, nor would sell the
messuage peremptorily or accept the offer of the plaintiff, or
declare the plaintiff the highest bidder and purchaser. There
were pleas, among others, of 1 not guilty," and a denial that the
defendant caused the handbills to be published and circulated as
alleged. If it had been alleged that any part of this representation was false to the knowledge of the defendant, and that the
plaintiff was induced by such deceit to incur expense by going to
the place of auction or the like, the count would have been good,
and the plaintiff, on proof of the deceit, would have been entitled
to such damages as he might have sustained by reason of expenses
or loss of time occasioned by his attendance at the sale, or possibly to merely nominal damages. But intentional deceit is neither
alleged nor was it attempted to be proved; what the plaintiff
relied on was, that there was a contract on the part of the defend1 COCKBURN, C. J., BLACKBRvN, J., MELLORI, J., and SnEE, J.
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ant that if the plaintiff was the highest bidder the premises should
be knocked down to him, and if he had proved such a contract,
the declaration would, probably after verdict, be understood as
alleging it, or at all events might easily be made so to do by an
amendment. But we think that no such contract was proved.
It appeared on the trial that the defendant was an auctioneer,
and that he had circulated handbills in which it was stated that
the premises, on the day in question, would be offered for peremptory sale by auction by Mr. J. Westley, the defendant, by direction of the mortgagee, with a power of sale subject to such
conditions as would be then declared, and at the bottom of the
bill was a statement in large capitals, "for further particulars
apply to Mr. Hustwick, solicitor, or the auctioneer." There is no
doubt that this was a representation by the defendant that he
intended to put up the premises for peremptory sale, but it also
contained a statement that he did so by direction of the mortgagee
and as agent for him, and though the name of that mortgagee is
not disclosed on the bill, the name of the solicitor, Mr. Hustwick,
is disclosed, and he is referred to as being the party from whom
further particulars were to be obtained. These parts of the handbills very materially qualify the representation stated in the
declaration, and it appeared that they were true. Hustwick was
the solicitor of the Yendor, and the representations were made by
his authority, and the plaintiff's complaint was that Hustwick
bought in the premises. If there was a contract on the part of
the defendant that the sale should be peremptory, it was truly
enough said that the contract was broken by allowing the property
to be bought in.
The plaintiff's counsel, in the argument before us, mainly relied
on the authority of the case of Tfarlow v. Harrison, where in the
Exchequer Chamber three learned judges gave their opinion that
where an auctioneer advertised a sale without reserve, not disclosing in any way who his principal was, he personally contracted
that there should be a sale without reserve. Two other learned
judges did not agree in this view, and it appears that ultimately
the Court of Exchequer Chamber pronounced no other judgment
than that the pleadings should be amended to enable the parties to
raise the question, unless they consented to a stet processus,
which they did. We do not think, therefore, that we are precluded by this as a judgment of a court of error, and, if neces-
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sary, we should be at liberty to consider the question whether
even in a case where the name of a principal is not disclosed by
an auctioneer, there is a contract by the latter such as is now
insisted on. The Lord Chief Justice and my brother SHEE are
of opinion that there is not, inasmuch as the character of an
auctioneer as agent is unlike that of many other agents as to whom
so long as the fact of their having a principal is undisclosed, it
remains uncertain whether the 'contracting party is acting as
principal or agent; while in the employment and duty of an auctioneer, the character of agent is necessarily implied, and the
party bidding at the auction knowingly deals with him as such,
and with the knowledge that his authority may at any moment be
put an end to by the principal; I myself should pause before
deciding upon this ground. I do not, however, wish to express
dissent from the view thus expressed, and we are all of opinion
that it is unnecessary to decide this point. The three judges who
formed the majority of the court in *Warlow v. Harrison,base
their opinion entirely on the fact that the vendor was not disclosed;
that he was a concealed principal ; .but in the present case the
passages in the handbill (which are not set out in the declaration)
showed that the defendant was acting for a principal, the mortgagee, who was described, and whose agent, Mr. Hustwick, was
named. Now, as a general rule, where an agent acts for a named
principal, the contract, if any, is yrimd facie with the principal,
not with the agent, and accordingly acting on this principle the
Court of King's Bench, in Evans v. Evans, 3 A. & E. 132,
decided that where premises were let by auction by the plaintiffs
as actioneers, but at the foot of the written conditions was written
"approved by David Jones," the contract of letting was not with
the plaintiffs, as auctioneers, but with David Jones.
,PATTEsoN,
J.. saying: "1On the document I can see no doubt; if the plaintiffs let for themselves, why is David Jones's name added ?" We
think this an express authority, that if there was -any contract in
this case it was with Hustwick, not with the defendant. We are
not to be understood as deciding that the plaintiff could not have
maintained this action against Hustwick, but merely that he has
failed in proving any case against the defendant. The rule therefore must be absolute to enter the verdict for the defendant.
Rule absolute.
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This case is of some importance, inasmuch as it modifies in some degree
the decision of the Court of Exchequer
Chamber in Warlow v. Harrison, 7 W.
R. 133, s.c. in error, 29 L. J. Q. B. 14,
and confines the liability of an auctioneer
within narrower limits than those there
indicated. There the defendant, who
kept a repository for the sale of horses
by auction, advertised three specified
horses, "the property of a gentleman,"
to be sold "without reserve," on the
24th June 1858. In the printed conditions of sale there was a stipulation that
the highest bidder should be the buyer.
The plaintiff attended the sale and bid
sixty guineas for one of the horses put
up. Thereupon the owner bid sixty-one
giineas, and the lot was knocked down
to him. The plaintiff then went to the
office of the defendant and claimed the
horse as his property. The defendant,
however, refused to deliver it, whereupon
an action similar to that in the principal
case was brought against him. It was
contended on the part of the plaintiff that,
according to the maxims both of the civil
and of English law, he was absolutely
entitled to the property, as the highest
bond fide bidder. As soon as the plaintiff had bid for the horse, the defendant,
it was urged, became his agent to complete the contract. "But," said Lord
CAMPBELL, C. J., "till the hanuner goes
down, the auctioneer is exclusively the
agent of the vendor." A bidding was,
in point of fact, in the learned judge's
view, a mere offer (Payne v. Cave, 3 T.
R. 148), the vendor and bidder being
free, and, a fortiorithe auctioneer, until
the hammer falls. Acting upon these
principles, the Court of Queen's Bench
decided that no action lay, at the same
time throwing out a suggestion that there
might be a remedy against the owner
himself for violation of the publicly-announced condition that the horse should
be sold without reserve.
The case was afterwards carried to the

Exchequer Chamber, and although the
judgment of the court below was affirmed as the pleadings stood, the court ex
pressed dissent from the view of the
auctioneer's position intimated by Lord
CAMPBELL.
"It seems to us," they
observed, "that the highest bond fide
bidder at an auction may sue the auctioneer as upon a contract that the sale
shall be without reserve." We think
that the auctioneer who puts property up
for sale upon such a condition pledges
himself that the sale shall be without reserve, or, in other words, contracts that
it shall be so, and that this contract is
made with the highest bond fide bidder,
and in case of a breach of it that he has
a right of action against the auctioneer.
The decision in the principal case certainly seems at first sight inconsistent
with the opinion above expressed, but
BLACXBURN, J., in the considered judgment of the court read by him, draws an
important distinction between the two
cases. In Warlow v. Harrison,the principal was undisclosed; in the principal
case he was disclosed. The handbill
showed that the defendant was acting
for a mortgagee. It described the sale
as "by direction of the mortgagee."
The contract to sell peremptorily, therefore, if with any one, was with Mr. Eustwick, the agent of the vendor, and not
with the auctioneer. The principle was
the same as that involved in Evans v.
Evans, 3 A. & E. 132. There certain
premises were let by auction by the plaintiffs as auctioneers, but at the foot of the
written conditions of sale were these
words, "approved by David Jones."
The court held the contract of letting to
be not with the plaintiffs but with Jones.
"On the docment," said PATTESON, J.,
"I can see no doubt. If the plaintiffs
let for themselves, why is David Jones's
name added ?" So here the contract to
sell without reserve was with Hustwick,
and not with the defendant. If with the
defendant, why, it may be asked, in the
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words of.PAvTTEsoN, J., was Hustwick's

name added?
It may be taken, therefore, as now
settled that where an auctioneer, whose
principal is disclosed, advertises property
for peremptory sale, and afterwards the
vendor chooses to put a reserve price on
such property, and buys it in, the auctioneer is not liable in an action for refusing to sell. Nor does this decision
conflict with the judgment in Warlow v.
1garrison, in the Exchequer Chamber,
inasmuch a$ in that case the fact of the
concealment of the principal was really
the ratio decidendi, and was expressed to
be so at the commencement of the judgment. The judgment, moreover, was
only that the pleadings should be amended, unless a stet processus were agreed
on. Accordingly, it cannot even be

considered as a binding decision on an
auctioneer's liability where the principal
is not disclosed. This point still remains
for future discussion. COCKBURN, C. J.,
and SIIEE, J., are of opinion that the
circumstance of disclosure or concealment makes no difference whatever.
The charficter of an auctioneer they consider as sufficient notice that he is dealing
as an agent, and not as a principal; but
BLACKnRNm, J., has a doubt as to the
correctness of the view there expressed.
However this may be, the judgment in
the principal case relieves auctioneers
definitely from all liability c6nsequent
on not selling without reserve, according
to advertisement, in cases where they
deal for disclosed principals who, at the
auction, place a reserve price on their
property.-Solicitors'Journal.

In the Court of Uhaneary.
MORTIMER v. BELL.'
At a sale of real estate by auction the vendors are not authorized in employing
two persons to bid against each other, although there is a reserved price; and such
persons do not, in fact, bid beyond that price.
Semble, the right to fix a reserved price ought to be stipulated for and expressly
notified.
Per LoaD CHA CELLO.-The rule, said to exist in equity, allowing one puffer
to be employed, without notice, to prevent a sale at an undervalue, is abstractly
less sound than the rule at law, which declares such employment to be fraudulent;
and rests only on the authority of decisions in lower branches of the court.

THIs was a suit by the vendors for the specific performance o
an agreement to purchase an estate. The plaintiffs,, who were
executors and trustees, had offered the property for sale by auction
and had instructed the auctioneer not to sell the property under
£4000. A person named Webb was employed by the vendors to
bid, and Webb started the biddings at £2600, and the auctioneer
and Webb bid alternately against each other for ten biddings,
I From 14 Weekly Reporter, p. 68.

MORTIMER v. BELL.

until £3600 was reached. The defendant then, for the first time,
bid Y3650, when the auctioneer, by the direction of one of the
plaintiffs, who was present, declared that the property was now
for open sale, and no other bidding being made, the property was
knocked down to the defendant. On subsequently discovering the
above facts, the defendant declined to complete his purchase, on
the ground that there had been fraudulent puffing, and the plaintiffs consequently filed the present bill.
The case was heard by the Master of the Rolls, who decided
that the auction was valid, and made a decree for specific performance of the contract. See 13 W. R. 569, where a full statement of the facts of the case will be found. From this decree
the defendant appealed.
Baggallay, Q. C., and Steere, for the plaintiffs, contended that
the sale was not vitiated by the puffing. Whatever might be the
rule at law, a rule had been recognised by the courts of equity
that a puffer might be employed to prevent a sale at an undervalue. Nothing more had been done here; for no bid had been
made for, the vendors in advance of the only bidding of the defendant. It was not necessary expressly to notify that there was a
reserved price, which was always to be inferred when a sale was
not expressed to be without reserve. Such was the common
practice of auctioneers, and it was followed even in sales under
the court: Sugd. Yen. & Pur. 9; Smith v. Clarke, 12 Yes. 477.
Hobhouse, Q. C., and Busk, for the defendant, contended that the
sale was invalid. The employment of any person without notice
bid for the vendor was fraudulent at law: Bexwell v. Christie,
1 Cowp. 395; Howard v. Castle, 6 T. R. 642; Thornett v.
ffaines, 15 M. & W. 367 ; Crowder v. Austin, 2 Car. &P. 208,
3 Bing. 368; Wheeler v. allier, 1 Moo. & M,: 123; Green v.
Baverstoc, 14 C. B. N. S. 204; Robinson v. Musgrove, 8 Car.
& P. 469; Teazie v. Williams, 8 How. U. S. 134; 2 Kent's
Com. on American Law 757, 10th ed.; Bell's Principles of Scotch
Law 51. The supposed rule in equity was not very firmly estab
lished, and at most only permitted the defensive practice of fixing
a reserved bidding, and of employing one bidder to bid for the
vendor, unless there was express .notice, and would never permit
a vendor to entrap a purchaser into a purchase at an over-value
by stimulating him by fictitious biddings, or sanction the employ
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ment of two bidders: Jervoise v. Clarke, 1 Jac. & Wal. 389;
Shaw v. Simpson, Id. 392 n.; Bramley v. Alt, 3 Yes.'619;
Conolly v. Parsons, Id. 625 n.; Woodward v. Miller, 2 Coll.
279; flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare 618; Walker v. Gascoigne, 2 Eq.
Ca. Abr. 483; s. a., sub tit. Walker v. Nightingale, 4 Br. P
C. 193; Rex v. Marsh, 3 Y. & S. 331; Meadows v. Tanner, 5
Madd. 34; Robinson v. Wall, 10 Bea-v. 61, 2 Ph. 372.
Baggallay, Q. C., in reply, said that the cases at law and in
equity could not be reconciled, and in this court the latter mus
prevail.
The Lord Chancellor asked whether Mr. Baggallay could
adduce any instance, other than in cases of auction puffing, in
which this Court had decreed specific performance of a contract
which would have been declared void by courts of law.
Baggallay, Q. C., knew of no such instance.
Lord CRANWORTH, C., after stating the facts of the case, said
that the conditions of sale contained the usual provision that the
highest bidder should be the purchaser. Courts of law had held
that such a condition prevented the vendor from interposing any
reservation, and that the vendor had by that condition agreed that
whoever offered the highest price should have the property. A
bidding by the vendor or his agent was, it was said, no bidding,
and so there was a contract that the highest bidder, other than the
vendor or his agent, should be the purchaser. It was not disputed
that the vendor might stipulate for the power of buying in the
property if it were going at an under-value. But, in the absence
of such stipulation, courts of law most certainly held that it was a
fraud in a vendor to interpose any bidder to prevent the property from going to the person who offered the highest price. It
was said that a different rule prevailed in courts of equity, viz.,
that without any express stipulation a vendor might always fix a
reserved price, and authorize a person to bid for him, unless the
sale was a property declared to be "without reserve," and it was
argued that the present case came within that rule.
That such a rule to some extent was said to exist could not be
doubted. Its existence had been recognised by many judges of
the highest reputation. Sir W. GRANT, in Smith v. Clarke, 12
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Ves. 481, not only recognised but apparently approved of the
rule.
When such an agreement was stipulated for, there was no fraud
nor deception, but it was said that even without express stipulation, such a right was understood to exist. His Lordship confessed that he thought that it was much better that such right
should be notified, for if it were not notified, there was a difference
between the language used and that which was said to be understood to be its import. The question in such cases might always
arise whether persons bidding were aware of the rule. The
usage of the Court of Chancery, ix modern times at all events,
was to stipulate expressly for the right not to sell under a fixed
price; and so, by implication, to employ a person to bid up to
that price. But, even if such a right might be assumed to be
reserved in every sale by auction, still that did not seem to warrant what was done in this case. Here there were in effect two
persons bidding for the vendors, viz., Webb and the auctioneer.
The whole sale up to the bidding of 36001. was a mere fiction.
When the vendor retains, either by express stipulation or by implied usage, a right to bid by an agent up to a fixed price, no real
bidder can be deceived by such bidding. If the real bidder bids
1000.2, and the auctioneer declares that a bidding of 1001. has
been made in advance, thus raising the bidding to l100Z., the real
bidder knows that this may be a mere bidding by the vendor, and
so, to whatever extent the bidding may go, every bidding may be
treated as a statement made by the auctioneer, acting as agent
for the vendor, that an advance has been offered to the amount
of the sum bid. When there is a real bidding, and the advance
has been made by the vendor's agent, pursuant to liberty expressly
or impliedly reserved, the auctioneer might truly say of this latter
bidding, as well as the others, that a further sum had been bid.
It is true that it was a sum bid by the vendor himself, but he had
reserved a right to bid, as was ex hpothesi known to the real
bidder. But how did that apply to a case like the present, where
there were two persons bidding for the vendors? When Webb
bid 2b00. for the property, the object of the vendors to prevent
a sale at a sum less than 40001. would have been fully secured
without any further bidding. The auctioneer had only, after waiting a reasonable time, to knock the property down to Mr. Webb
as the only bidder. When the auctioneer took upon himself to
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make an advance of 1001. on Webb's bidding, he must be considered as having said, "Mr. Webb has bid 25001. ; but A. 13. has
bid 26001. ;" and so on through all the biddings up to 36001.
The whole proceeding was a fiction, calculated, if not intended,
to deceive persons who thought of becoming purchasers. There
was neither principle nor authority for holding that in such a case
a vendor, who by this misrepresentation had induced a third person to bid, could enforce his contract.
In Bromley v. Alt, 3 Yes. 620, it was expressly found that there
was only one bidder for the plaintiff, who bid only seventy-five
guineas per acre, the price fiied by the vendors; all the other
biddings were real biddings. In Simith v. Clarke, 12 Yes. 477,
there was only one person employed, with express orders to allow
the lot to be sold if a sum exceeding 7501. should be bid, but not
under that price. It was accordingly knocked down to a purchaser at 7601., and Sir W. GRANT held this to be a fair transaction. In Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare 618, Lord Justice TURNER,
then Vice-Chancellor, came to the same conclusion. The current
of authorities had been so strong in favor of allowing a single
bidder, that he (the Lord Chancellor) might have found it difficult
to go against them, though agreeing with what was said by Lord
Justice KNIGHT BRUCE, when Vice-Chancellor, in TFoodward v.
Miller, 2 Coll. 279, 282, that, abstractedly, the legal doctrine
was the soundest; and the same was evidently the opinion of the
Master of the Rolls. At the same time, the authorities in question included no decision of the Lord Chancellor or the Lords
Justices.
Here, however, for the reasons indicated, the question did not
arise because there were two bidders. The decree of the Master
of the Rolls must be reversed, and the bill be dismissed with
costs.

